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ABSTRACT 
Word Length: the text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 12,006 words. 
Water is arguably the most important resource on the planet. There are many competing 
demands for use of this resource, including in New Zealand. Water has been allocated to 
users through an administrative system, an inflexible, unresponsive system which does 
not encourage efficient use of the resource and cannot respond to variations in water 
supply and demand. Implementing tradable water rights in New Zealand allows those 
with the most knowledge of water requirements to be involved with the selling and 
buying of water rights. Tradable water rights provide an equitable way of increasing 
efficiency and flexibility in water use, and provide incentives for using water efficiently. 
They are a sensible option for New Zealand to adopt to deal with water allocation issues. 
"When the well is dry, we know the worth of water. " 
- Benjamin Franklin 
I Introduction 
The value and importance of water needs no explanation. Ancient 
civilisations were founded around water, 1 and it is no less important in 
modem times, necessary to fulfil indispensable productive, environmental 
and social objectives. Worldwide water use statistics show that 69 percent 
of water is used in agriculture, 23 percent in industry and 8 percent for 
domestic purposes.2 The vital nature of water means that often there is 
significant state intervention in the granting and administration of rights to 
use it. 3 Water is most commonly allocated by one of two methods, 
administrative allocation or market-based allocation. Most water systems 
around the world are a hybrid of the two methods although there are 
countries that veer to the extremes of the allocation spectrum. England, 
Wales and New Zealand are examples of water allocation systems that are 
almost entirely administrative4 while Chile is one of the closest examples of 
a pure market-based system for water allocation.5 
There has been some criticism of, and frustration with, the Government's 
role in water reform, including the issue of tradable water rights, with New 
1 Brian Easton "Nor any drop to drink" (May 15-21 2004) The Listener New Zealand 
<http://www.listener.co.nz/printable,l 964.sm> (last accessed 5 July 2005). 
2 Paul Holden and Mateen Thobani "Tradable Water Rights-A Property Rights Approach to 
Resolving Water Shortages and Promoting Investment" (1996) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 1627 1, 2. 
3 Holden and Thobani ,above n 2, 1. 
4 I note however that England is moving to make water transfer more achievable with the 
passing into legislation of the Water Act 2003. The rules for water trading have been 
simplified to facilitate more trading and allow a more market-based system to develop. 
5 Kevin Counsell "Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation: A Review of Domestic and 
International Practices" (2003) New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competiton and 
Regulation, 26 <http ://www.iscr.org.nz/index.html> (last accessed 27 July 2005). 
1 
Zealand's record of water reform being described as "abysmal".
6 The main 
arguments against water allocation through a centralised administration 
system is that such a system is inefficient and costly, results in water being 
used in low value uses rather than high value uses, inhibits competition, 
encourages wasteful usage practices and discourages conservation and 
sustainability of the resource. 
Water is such a valuable resource that it is critical to use it in the most 
efficient manner possible, which means looking to ways to encourage this. 
An administrative system of allocation does not encourage the transfer of 
water rights between users. Transferable water rights can provide an 
equitable way of increasing efficiency and flexibility in water use within 
New Zealand. Trading of water rights between users creates a water market 
which by finding the value of the water creates greater incentives for 
defining water rights clearly, improving their measurement and 
enforcement, and establishing mechanisms to resolve disputes.7 
While historically, water rights have always transferred with the sale of the 
land that they are tied to, 8 this paper concentrates on the transfer of water 
separately from the land to which it is applied. This paper identifies the 
crucial requirements for a water market trading in water rights to be 
effective and successful, considers other countries that have implemented 
trading in water rights, and concludes that implementing and encouraging 
the use of tradable water rights in New Zealand is a sensible option to deal 
with growing demands for water and an increasingly scarce resource. 
6 Roger Kerr, above n 30, 1. 
7Holden and Thobani ,above n 2, 14. 
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II BACKGROUND 
A Water Use in New Zealand 
The total amount of precipitation falling annually in New Zealand is 
estimated as between 300 billion and 600 billion cubic metres, which 
unsurprisingly is not spread evenly, geographically or chronologically. 9 
While therefore New Zealand has abundant rainfall, the disparities between 
where it falls and when it falls causes an issue in terms of certainty. New 
Zealand's water as a result is a national resource with specific local 
characteristics. The west is wet and the east is dry. 10 Water is used in New 
Zealand for a number of competing activities with the primary use being 
irrigation. The area of irrigated land has approximately doubled every 
decade since the 1960's and now accounts for nearly 80% of all water 
allocated in New Zealand. 11 Hydro-generation also accounts for a large 
proportion of water used in New Zealand, although the water used in hydro-
generation re-enters the river system downstream. It is also worth noting 
that, given the rapidly dwindling supply of gas, there is likely to be a further 
increase in demand placed upon the power supplied by hydro-generation in 
the future, thus increasing the amount of water used in power generation. 
Water is also required for livestock consumption, domestic, industry and 
commercial consumption, sustenance of flora and fauna, and recreation. 12 
8 S Hodgson "Land and Water-the Rights Interface" (2004) FAO Legislative Study, 41. 
9 Counsell, above n 5, 4. 
1° Colin James "Water, Water everywhere and not a moment to think" (4 May 2005) The 
New Zealand Business Herald Column, Auckland < http ://www.nzherald.co.nz> (last 
accessed 3 July 2005). 
11 Ministry for the Environment Freshwater for a Sustainable Future: Issues and Options: 
A Public Discussion Paper on the Management of New Zealand's freshwater resources 
(Wellington 2004). 
12 New Zealand Business Roundtable "Reform of the Water Industry" (August 1995), 4 
<http://www.nzbr.org.nz/> (last accessed 15 August 2005). 
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B Common law 
Under the riparian rights doctrine, a landowner can receive water on their 
land in two ways-by rainfall on the land, or by water adjoining the property. 
The landowner has surface rights (for the rainfall on the land) or riparian 
rights (for the water adjoining the property) to that water, entitling them to 
use that water for the needs of their property. The fundamental tenet of 
riparian water rights is that a riparian owner has "no property in the water of 
a stream flowing through or past his land but is entitled only to the use of it 
as it passes along for the enjoyment of his property". 13 Therefore under 
common law, the water could not be owned directly but could be 
appropriated by the landowner placing it in storage. 14 
A distinction has been held between the three ways in which a riparian 
landowner is able to utilise water from the stream on or bounding his 
property. 15 A landowner may use the water for his ordinary or primary 
purpose, such as domestic and cattle uses. There is no limit on how much 
water may be abstracted for this purpose, in fact a landowner has the right to 
completely exhaust the water. Secondly, the water may be used for 
extraordinary or secondary purposes which need to have a nexus with the 
landowner's land, provided that certain conditions are complied with. These 
uses could be irrigation or industrial uses. These conditions are fairly 
restrictive, requiring that the landowner's water use be reasonable, the 
purposes for which the water is taken need to be connected with the 
tenement, and the landowner is bound to restore the water that he has used 
"substantially undiminished in volume and unaltered in character". 16 
Williams noted that this is a "crippling requirement" as the use of water for 
13 Glenmark Homestead Limited v North Canterbury Catchment Board [1975] 2 NZLR 71 , 
81. 
14 Harris Consulting The Agribusiness Group Property Rights in Water: A Review of 
Stakeholders' Understanding and Behaviour (prepared for the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry and the Ministry for the Environment, 2003), 7. 
15 DAR Williams Environmental and Resource Management Law in New Zealand (211d ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1997), 24 7. 
16 Williams, above n 14, 248. 
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extraordinary purposes will almost certainly result in the diminishment of 
the water volume, if not the character. 17 The third way in which a riparian 
owner can utilise the water on his land is for uses unconnected with his or 
her tenement. The riparian owner does not have the benefits of any rights in 
this situation. Both upper and lower riparian owners are subject to 
constraints. Upper riparian owners are subject to the other upper riparian 
owners who are entitled to use their water as noted above and are also 
required to send an unimpeded flow of water to lower riparian owners. 
Lower riparian owners are subject to the requirements of the upper riparian 
owners and the other lower riparian owners below them, again having to 
provide an unimpeded flow of water. A landowner is entitled to have the 
normal flow of water through his property, which is subject to the exercise 
of rights by the upper riparian owners and further reasonable use by the. The 
natural flow of water is defined as being without sensible increase or 
decrease and without ordinary changes in character or quality. 18 
The riparian rights doctrine has generally been used in areas with relatively 
abundant water supplies and where strict definition of water rights is 
essential. 19Without such property rights the issue of the "commons" arises, 
where the resource is exploited by all in an unsustainable manner, resulting 
in the degradation and eventual ruin of the resource. 
C Statutory Framework 
The Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 established a regulatory 
structure for the administration and conservation of water resources, and 
declared all natural waters to be vested in the Crown.20 As noted in 
17 Williams, above n 14, 248. 
18 John Young Co v Bankier Distillery Company [1893] AC 691 , 698 (HC). 
19 Holden and Thobani ,above n 2, 2. See for example France and eastern United States. 
20 The Water and Soil Conservation Act I 967. See generally the Long Title to the Act 
which states: "An Act to promote a national policy in respect of water and to make better 
provision for the conservation, allocation, use and quality of natural water. .. and for 
promoting and controlling multiple uses for natural water and the drainage of land and for 
ensuring that adequate account is taken of the needs of primary and secondary industry, 
5 
Glenmark Homestead Limited v North Canterbury Catchment Board [1975] 
2 NZLR 71, the Water and Soil Conservation Act was notable for 
apparently eliminating all common law rights to water. In Stanley v South 
Canterbury Catchment Board (1971) 4 NZTPA 63, it was noted that the 
right to take natural water had been vested in the Crown, but that a co-
existing statutory right to take water was created in favour of anyone who 
wanted to and could avail himself of it. 21 Therefore, although riparian 
owners had lost their common law right to water, they could take water for 
domestic or stock purposes under a statutory right. The primary 
responsibility for the allocation and management of water resources under 
the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1976 rested with the regional water 
boards and catchment boards. 
I Resource Management Act 
Under the Resource Management Act 1991 ("RMA"), the right to use water 
is still vested in the Crown. The aim of the RMA is to promote "the 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources", achieved by 
prohibiting or restricting activities that are expected to have an adverse 
effect on the environment. The system of making policy and decisions under 
the RMA is far more workable than that under the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967. 22 The responsibility for managing the country's 
water resources is delegated to the regional councils and therefore 
decentralised to the extent that decisions are made at the regional and local 
district council level rather than at the central government level. The 
jurisdiction of the regional councils includes the enforcement of sections 14 
and 15 of the RMA, the granting and administration of water permits and 
making relevant rules and policies.23 Sections 14 and 15 of the RMA are the 
most important provisions for the management and control of water 
water supplies of local authorities, fisheries, wildlife habitats , and all recreational users of 
natural water." 
2 1 Williams, above n 14,252. 
22 Williams, above n 14, 283. 
23 Williams, above n 14, 284. 
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resources. Section 14 provides, relevant for this report, that no one may take 
water unless it is specifically allowed by a regional plan or resource consent 
or specified exceptions, one of which is taking water for domestic needs. 
Section 15 relates to discharges into water and is not relevant for this paper. 
The regional councils then make decisions on the allocation and use of the 
water within that council's regional boundaries, guided by the regional plans 
and policy statements each council drafts. Because the decision-making is 
done at the regional and district council level, the decision-makers are able 
to tailor decisions to the needs and preferences of smaller areas and groups, 
rather than being required to take national needs into account. However, in 
criticism of the administrative allocation system, it has been stated that the 
process of deciding which proposed water uses are or are not appropriate, 
who may carry them out, and how competing interests may be reconciled or 
traded off is a political process, based on consultation, consultation and rule-
making. 24 As such, the process is vulnerable to political interference and 
pressure from lobbyists. 
Anyone wanting to use or take water for any purpose, unless such use is 
authorised by the regional plan, must apply to the relevant regional council 
for a resource consent under the RMA. Because the country's natural water 
resources are vested in the Crown, holding a water permit does not give the 
holder ownership over the water, nor does it guarantee availability. Section 
122 of the RMA explicitly states that resource consents are not real or 
personal property. Any application is assessed against the relevant regional 
plans and policy statements. The chief concern when assessing the 
application is whether the proposed water use/s adversely affects the 
environment or other water pennit holders. The focus therefore has to be on 
avoiding, remedying, or mitigating the adverse effects of granting the permit 
and the potential impact on existing permit holders. The regional councils 
also have to take into consideration the other parameters they are required to 
work within such as ensuring for example minimum flows, maximum rates 
24 New Zealand Business Roundtable, above n 11 , 4. 
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of take and allocatable volumes. 25 If a resource consent application is 
accepted, a water permit is issued which grants the holder the right to take 
or use, dam or divert, subject to availability, the water specified in the 
permit. The permits do not run with the land, but are personal to the pennit 
holder. They are able to be acted upon by others with the permit holder's 
consent unless the conditions of the permit forbid this. The permits can be 
transfe1Ted to a new landowner upon application to the council. 
Most councils allocate water on a "first-come, first-served" basis to 
applicant who can meet the sustainability requirements of the RMA, with no 
comparative process undertaken by the council to compare competing 
applications for water permits. A decision as to what volume of water can 
be taken is made on what the applicant's reasonable need for the water is. 
Pennits are granted for between 1 and 35 years, with no guarantees of 
renewal although in practice renewal usually occurs. Nearly all permits are 
subject to review or renewal at five to 15 year intervals,26 with permits able 
to lapse if they are not used within 5 years of being granted, and able to be 
cancelled if they are not exercised for a continuous period of 2 or more 
years.
27 
The permits apply to the permit holder at the site specified and are 
able to be transferred to a new land owner or site occupier on application to 
the council. 
Section 136 of the RMA allows permits to take water to be transferred 
provided that transfers are expressly allowed by a regional plan or upon 
application to the consent authority. If the relevant regional plan allows for 
it, water pem1its can be transferred between different areas in the same 
catchment. This can also happen where the regional council grants a specific 
application to transfer, where the application is made by both parties to the 
proposed transfer, after considering the environmental effects of the transfer 
25 
Harris Consulting The Agribusiness Group, above n 13 , 11. 
26 
Lincoln Environmental Information on Water Allocation in New Zealand Report No 
43 75/1 (Prepared for the Ministry for the Environment, 2000). 
27
Ministry for the Environment Technical Working Paper Water Programme of Action-
Water Allocation and Use (Wellington , 2004) 
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and other matters set out in section 104 of the RMA. Constraints are 
imposed to protect third party rights or to control environmental effects. 
A provision to allow off-site transfers has not been included in the majority 
of regional plans to date and where such transfers have occurred they have 
been limited.28 In practice however, few regional plans allow for the transfer 
of permits and the areas governed by regional plans that do allow transfers, 
such transfers rarely occur, other than transfer in conjunction with land 
(such as through the sale and purchase of irrigated blocks).29 
If a particular water body is fully allocated or over-allocated ( defined in one 
survey as relating to a resource where the "existing take is close to the 
maximum that can be justified under the RMA", or where an allocation limit 
has been set and the existing allocation retrospectively found to be above 
the allocation limit) 30, different councils have different methods of dealing 
with this. Some councils address the issue of over-allocation by adjusting 
existing permits to better reflect the actual take, adjusting consents at the 
time of renewal or review and monitoring the take from those resources 
under pressure more intently. 
New applications to take from fully or over-allocated resources are either 
declined, considered on a discretionary basis, or placed upon informal, 
unadvertised waiting lists, such as the one operated by the Tasman District 
Council.31 
III Current Issue 
Water allocation has always generated competition between competing 
demands from different users, and also with environmental requirements. It 
has been noted that the contest for water in New Zealand has reached the 
28 
Ministry for the Environment Technical Working Paper Water Programme of Action-
Water Allocation and Use, above n 25. See for example on the Ngarurora River in the 
Hawkes Bay, 15 transfers have happened over the last 8 years. 
29 
Christina Robb, Matthew Morgan and Simon Harris Attitudes and Barriers to Water 
Transfer Report No 4464/1 (prepared for Ministry for the Environment, 2001), 2. 
30 Lincoln Environmental, above n 25. 
31 Lincoln Environmental , above n 25. 
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point where not only is there the traditional competition between 
environmental/out of stream uses, but also competition between out-of-
stream applications with those fortunate enough to already hold permits 
reaping the benefits of that permit, despite the value of the use the water is 
being put to. 32 As noted above, rainfall in New Zealand is not distributed 
evenly, resulting in scarcer water supplies. At the same time, competition 
between users is intensifying, and the increasing population places 
additional strain on the country's water resources as shown by Auckland's 
water shortages in 1994, the Marlborough droughts in 2001 and the recent 
competition for the water of the Waitaki River. 
The question of valuing water has had little attention in New Zealand to 
date. This is evidenced by the process described above, of allocating water 
by virtue of "first in, first served". The value of water to applicants is not 
considered during the application process. Competition for water is 
exacerbated by an inability to trade water pennits. Because of its 
inexperience with market-based allocation and water trading, New Zealand 
is in a good position to analyse the water allocation situation. Most of the 
water bodies are not fully allocated as they are in Australia. Australia failed 
to monitor the impact of water trade on continuity of water supply, 
conservation of water stores, and management of environmental concerns. 33 
As noted above, there is some over-allocation already however such as the 
Wai-iti Valley where water resources were most recently shown to be over-
allocated by 22% in drought conditions.34 "Red-zones" have being 
established in Canterbury, where no new water allocation is permitted, 
irrespective of the potential positive economic spin-offs.35 The amount of 
water being used, especially by the biggest user, irrigation, gives rise to 
potential for negative effects on the health of the river systems, as has 
32 Basil M H Sharp "Economics of Water Rights in New Zealand: Governance, decision-
making and values" (Paper presented to the Royal Society Conference on Water Resource 
Management, November 2003). 
33 Andrew MacDonald, above n 33. 
34 Tasman District Council, Council Projects, 
<http ://www. tdc.govt.nz/index.php?CouncilProjects> (last accessed 14 August 2005) . 
35 Roger Kerr "Reforming Water Allocation and Supply in New Zealand" (Speech to the 
2005 New Zealand Environment Summit, 2005). 
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occurred in the Murray River in Australia.36 The resulting urgent clawbacks 
of water in Australia are creating uncertainty for investors as no stability of 
water rights.37 Clawbacks are already provided for in the Tasman District 
Plan. Growth and intensification have happened very rapidly and the water 
allocation system has failed to adjust and keep up with this. 
Because trading in water rights is uncommon, the result is often that water 
rights are assigned and used for low-value purposes, at the expense of high-
valued purposes. Users are also not encouraged to conserve the resource, 
culminating in its exploitation and eventual degradation. The issue is 
whether New Zealand should implement a tradable water rights regime or 
persevere with the established administrative allocation system. 
IV Administrative allocation vs Tradable Water Rights 
As noted earlier, most countries use a combination of the two water 
allocation methods: 38 
In practice, most countries have some combination of water allocation 
mechanisms. Each allocation mechanism has advantages and disadvantages. 
Efficiency is an important goal but the allocation mechanisms that are considered 
efficient are often hard to implement and require supporting infrastructure and 
institutions in addition to expensive monitoring and enforcement systems. 
Therefore, top-level commitment to water allocation that pursues economic 
efficiency is needed. 
36 Andrew MacDonald Australia's water trouble a warning to big users (22 September 
2004) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland. < http: //www.nzherald.co.nz> (last accessed 3 
July 2005). See for example the AUD500 million "Living Murray" project intended to 
repair environmental damage already done to the Murray River and other linked waterways, 
and an attempt to prevent further deterioration. 
37 Ministry for the Environment Technical Working Paper Water Programme of Action-
Water Allocation and Use, above n 25. 
38 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Technical Paper 2001/7 Economic Efficiency of 
Water A/location (prepared for Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Wellington, 2001), 3. 
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A Administrative water allocation 
Administrative water allocation has traditionally been used in many 
countries because of the unique nature of water. Its physical characteristics, 
the public's perception of it as a common resource or public good, and the 
large costs associated with water development have made it difficult for 
private development and allocation of water resources to occur. 39 A major 
disadvantage of administrative water allocation is the role of the "first in, 
first served" approach in failing to distinguish between low value uses and 
high value uses, as well as the lack of incentives created for water users to 
conserve water.40 While coercion is the main incentive to comply with 
obligations created by the state but given the lack of council enforcement 
noted by water users, the prospect of sanctions is relatively easy to discount. 
Administrative allocation can also be subject to political pressures, making 
the process appear non-transparent with the decision-makers isolated from 
the relevant information sources needed to make the decisions, and finally, 
non-accountable. Administrative allocation is too inflexible to respond to 
day to day changes in water demand and supply, and also inhibits 
competition and investment. 
B Tradable water rights 
Trad able water rights allow the price of water to reflect the value of its 
alternative uses, thereby creating incentives to put the water to its most 
productive use. 41 Water can be shifted to higher value uses in a cheaper 
manner than some alternatives, such as building new water transfer 
infrastructure, or charging for water use. Tradable water rights also 
encourage water conservation, given that water users have incentives to sell 
their unused water allocations. Tradable water rights should also regulate 
39 
Ariel Dinar, Mark W Rosegrant and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, above n 39, 8. 
40 Mark W Rosegrant and Renato Gazmuri Reforming Water Allocation Policy through 
Markets in Tradab/e Water Rights: Lessons from Chile, Mexico and California Discussion 
Paper No 6 (Presented at DSE/IFPRI/ISIS workshop on Agricultural Sustainability, 
Growth and Poverty Alleviation in East and SouthEast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 1994). 
41 Holden and Thobani ,above n 2, 11. 
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the growth of water demand and promote flexibility in water use. 42 The 
spectre of political interference is removed from allocation decisions, and 
investment in water intensive projects is facilitated.43 One of the major 
disadvantages most often cited against the implementation of markets is the 
pervasiveness of externalities and the possible effects on third parties. These 
can be justified from an economically efficient perspective by considering 
them in the context of the transfers and the costs associated with them. 
Compensation for third parties should be paid if someone has been 
harmed.44 
V Markets 
"The objective of creating water markets is to allow a transparent expression of the value of 
limited water resources, and to enable it to flow to more profitable or higher value use 
(within physical and environmental constraints) . Broader and deeper markets, appropriate 
pricing and a larger range of instruments will allow for better management of . .. risks." 45 
A market for something will exist if there are people who want to buy the 
thing and people who want to sell the thing. From an economic perspective, 
the four following factors are required for a market to operate successfully 
and competitively.46 Firstly, the market should have many sellers and 
buyers, all equipped with the same information about the market and facing 
similar conditions, such as similar transaction costs. Secondly, the buyers 
and sellers need to have decision-making autonomy, with voluntary 
participation in the exchange and the right to veto any deal. 47 While each 
participant should be free to make the decisions that reflect their preference, 
42 John J. Pigram, Robert J Delforce, Michelle L Coelli,, Yo! Norris, George Antony , 
Raymond L Anderson, Warren F Musgrave Transferable Water Entitlements in Australia 
(Centre for Water Policy Research, Annidale 1992), 8. 
43 Counsell, above n 5, 47. 
44 Ariel Dinar, Mark W Rosegrant and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, above n 39, 15. 
45 Josh Cannody, Partner Baker & McKenzie "Water Refonn in Australia" (Speech to 
Meridian Energy Seminar, Wellington, 18 August 2005). 
46 Ariel Dinar, Mark W Rosegrant and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, above n 39, 13. 
47 John McMillan Reinventing the Bazaar A Natural Histo1y of Markets (W.W Norton & 
Company Inc, New York, 2002), 
13 
it should also be noted that any decisions made will be necessarily 
constrained by the amount of water available and the rules of the 
marketplace. Thirdly, the decisions finally made by each buyer and seller 
should not impact on the outcome of another individual. Finally, the buyers 
and sellers should be motivated to maximise the profits received. Given 
these parameters, the resource being traded should move from lower value 
uses to higher value uses-making the market economically efficient. 
Competition, not a defining factor of a market, usually present and adds to 
autonomy. Curbs any individual participant's power, prevents anyone from 
having decisive effect on overall outcomes. Competition provides 
alternatives 
The definition of a market transaction can therefore be stated as follows: 
"An exchange that is voluntary: each party can veto it, and (subject 
to the rules of the marketplace) each freely agrees to the terms. 48 
The value of water is what it can produce. Rosegrant and Gazmuri (1994) 
states that there are three main forces behind the reform of water allocation 
and the eventual creation and establishment of water markets.49 Firstly, the 
there needs to be an increasing economic value of water due to scarcity 
which is brought about by rapid growth in demand as well as the depletion 
of new supply sources and competition for water amongst different users. 
Secondly, there needs to be increased expenditure in maintaining and 
operating water systems. Thirdly, there needs to be an increase in the 
economic cost of maintaining inflexible and inefficient water allocation 
systems which cannot respond quickly to changing incentives and 
comparative advantages. 
48 John McMillan, above n 48 , 6. 
49 
Mark W Rosegrant and Renato Gazmuri, above n 42. I note that Rosegrant and Gazmuri 
considered these three main forces in relation to the creation or expansion of water markets 
in California, Chile and Mexico. 
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A water market can either be a formal or informal one ( often described as a 
"spot water market"). Formal secure tradable water rights are independent 
ofland and can be traded separately from that land within a legal and 
institutional framework, making them property rights to water. 50 Informal 
water markets arise out of the government's failure to adequately allocate 
water and individuals or groups of water rights holders sell the water to 
other users at negotiated prices. 51 These types of transactions are, by reason 
of their informality, temporary, can be difficult to enforce, and inhibit 
investments in activities that require copious amounts of water because of 
the uncertainty of access. 52 The four factors required to set up a functioning 
market were noted above, but given the nature of water, further 
requirements are usually needed to engender the necessary operating 
conditions. State intervention is generally required to define the initial 
allocation of water rights, create the institutional and legal frameworks for 
trade, and invest in the basic necessary infrastructure needed to allow the 
water transfers to proceed. 53 Markets, including water markets, still require 
some government intervention in establishing and maintaining an 
environment in which the market can operate efficiently. 54 This is relevant 
to discussion of a potential water market for New Zealand later on in this 
paper. 
Water markets work because the mechanisms allows decisions and use of 
water tradeoffs to be made at the "coal face", where information about the 
use and value of the resource is greatest and can be made by persons who 
are accountable for those choices. Both the seller and the buyer have the 
opportunity to maximise the benefits available to them, in that the seller can 
increase profitability and the buyer has access to increased water availability 
as a result of the market. 55 A water market has the ability to impress on 
50 Holden and Thobani ,above n 2, 6. 
51 Holden and Thobani, above n 2 , 6. 
52 Holden and Thobani, above n 2, 6. 
53 Ariel Dinar, Mark W Rosegrant and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, above n 39, 13. 
54 John McMillan, above n 48 , 11 . 
55 Dinar, Rosegrant, Meinzen-Dick, above n 39, 13 . 
15 
water users the full opportunity cost of the water, providing incentives to 
use the water efficiently and to earn additional income by selling unused 
allocations.56 Water users are incentivised to acknowledge the external costs 
imposed by their use of water, which has the flow-on effect of reducing the 
pressure to exploit the resource. 57 One of the major advantages of a water 
market compared to the centralised system of water allocation is the ability 
and flexibility to respond quickly to changes in demand, as water values and 
crop prices vary. Water markets also provide the opportunity for water users 
to exit the market, and consequently also allow new and expanding users to 
gain access to the resource. 58 It has been noted that water markets also 
provide an opening for governments to acquire licences on the market and 
either subsequently reallocate them or retire them.59 This concept could be 
extended by water markets fulfilling an important function in terms of 
meeting environmental obligations by permitting water to be allocated for 
environmental purposes. In areas where water licences are fully allocated, a 
water market provides flexibility to transfer water where it is required. 
Constraints on water markets can be imposed out of a desire to prevent 
monopolisation of water licences, perhaps feared from corporate or foreign 
interests and the potential follow on of adverse environmental and social 
effects for the relevant communities, the water users themselves, and 
infrastructure. However, such constraints can prevent water moving to its 
highest value uses and may compromise efficiency. Therefore, for a water 
market to be successful and gain maximum economic benefits, unhindered 
transferability of water rights in a freely operating market is necessary.60 
A water market therefore appears to have many benefits over the 
administrative allocation system. Given these apparent benefits, other 
56 Mark W Rosegrant and Renato Gazmuri, above n 42. 
57 Dinar, Rosegrant, Meinzen-Dick, above n 39 , 14. 
58 John J Pigram "Tradeable Water Rights: The Australian Experience" (1999) Centre for 
Water Policy Research, University of New England, Armidale, Australia, 8. 
59 Pigram, above n 58, 8. 
60 Pigram, above n 58 , 9. 
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countries that are struggling with the dilemma of a growing amount of 
competing demands for an increasingly scarce resource, or anticipating 
doing so, have also considered and implemented tradable water rights. The 
emerging thinking by countries grappling with how to allocate water in a 
sustainable manner can be summarised as follows: 61 
A key issue to emerge from this overview is that countries have turned their 
attention from water resource development to water resource allocation and water 
quality. The notion of supplying water as a community good is being replaced by 
the concept of water as an economic good and a key factor in achieving economic 
growth. This change in emphasis is signalled by the evolution of new and 
innovative institutional arrangements. The old "development model" centred on 
centralised decision-making and administrative regulation is being replaced by a 
new model based on decentralised allocation, economic instruments, and 
stakeholder participation. 
The concept of water markets and tradable water rights is not an isolated 
antipodean idea. It is notable that Spain has used water markets for several 
centuries. 62 This section will provide an extremely brief summary of the 
situation in some of those countries, selected because they are most often 
cited in the literature as examples of water markets. I note that due to the 
developing nature of some of the countries, the general context of the issue 
is dissimilar from New Zealand. However, I consider their experiences can 
still provide a useful guide when considering New Zealand's position and 
the best way for New Zealand to progress on this issue. 
61 Basil M H Sharp, above n 28 , 2. 
62 Richard Reidinger "Observations on Water Markets for Irrigation Systems" (1994) (A 
paper selected from the World Bank's Ninth Annual Irrigation and Drainage Seminar, 
United States of America, 1992), World Bank Technical Paper 249, 55. 
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Overseas experience 
Chile 
Chile established tradable water rights in 1981 by the implementation of the 
Water Code,63 although water markets were operating for a considerable 
length of time before this fonnalisation of a water rights market. 64 Existing 
water users are granted water rights free of charge, while auctions are used 
if there are competing demands for the unallocated water rights. 65 The 
acquisition of water rights is recorded in a public registry, maintaining 
security of the rights. The transfers are extremely flexible and can be either 
temporary or permanent, consumptive or non-consumptive. As noted earlier, 
there is a very minor role for the government to play in Chile's water 
allocation. Some authors note that there is mixed opinion as to whether the 
water market has been successful, with conflict emerging between rights 
holders as a result of the distinction between consumptive and non-
consumptive rights and a loss of efficiency, 66 while others consider that the 
market has been a success with flexibility and control over water rights, and 
voluntary transfers of water to more productive uses.67 
A key feature of Chile's water allocation system is the existence of water 
user associations which are owned and operated by members. 68 These 
associations are often set up for the benefit of irrigators, although there have 
been examples of associations that serve all water users for a common water 
source. The associations manage and maintain infrastructure to deliver the 
water and are also responsible for recording, managing and enforcing the 
water rights and transfers.69 Rosegrant and Gazmuri70 consider that 
63 Holden and Thobani ,above n 2, 7. 
64 Counsell, above n 5, 39 . 
65 Holden and Thobani, above n 2, 7. 
66 Counsell, above n 5, 40. 
67 Holden and Thobani, above n 2, 8. 
68 Counsell, above n 5, 40. 
69 Counsell, above n 5, 40. 
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assigning tradable water rights to individuals within water user associations 
should have the effect of enhancing the control of the group over the water 
resource. The authors also note that if the water rights are well defined, the 
association would have an incentive to economise on water uses and the 
legal standing to negotiate, for example with water delivery agencies, for 
timely and efficient service. 
Mexico 
In the early 1990's, Mexico began to shift from a state-centralised and 
highly regulated system to a more market-oriented one.71 In 1992, the 
National Water Law was passed, and subsequent 1994 regulations, which 
increased security of water rights tenure ( called "concessions") and allowed 
for the temporary or permanent transfers of concessions. 72 Similar to Chile, 
informal water trades were occurring prior to the implementation of the 
legislation, with the same issues arising from these illegal trades. Again 
mirroring Chile's example, the concessions are recorded in a public registry. 
Colorado 
Generally, the water allocation system on the western side of the United 
States has been based on the doctrine of prior appropriation: "first in time, 
first in right".73 A common feature of the water rights regimes in the 
different states is that to change the uses to which the water is put requires 
authorisation from the state water authorities. 74 An interesting example of 
less restrictive trading of water rights can be found in Colorado's Big 
Thompson project. This project is a major water supply scheme in north-
east Colorado which supplies water to supplement users' existing supplies 
70 Mark W Rosegrant and Renato Gazmuri, above n 42. 
71 
Mark W Ro egrant and Renato Gazmuri, above n 42. 
72 Counsell, above n 5, 38. 
73 Holden and Thobani, above n 2, 10. 
74 Holden and Thobani, above n 2, 10. 
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obtained from other sources. 75 Initially the scheme was partially paid for by 
water users in the water district, with the right to use the water when 
required. As a result of varying water demands, the system was altered to 
allow the trading of water rights on a permanent basis with the only 
requirement being that the water is put to a "beneficial use", there are no 
sales outside the District, and that the rules of the District are obeyed. 76 As 
in Chile and Mexico, a central register is kept to record ownership and 
transfers. Holden and Thobani (1996) cite one of the reasons for the 
project's success is that water users retain the right to any return flows. 
Downstream users get the benefit of return flows from the upstream user but 
do not have any rights to those flows, leaving the upstream user free to trade 
their rights without being required to compensate the downstream users. 
Australia 
As the world's driest continent,77 the issue of water has always been a 
critical one for Australia. The lack of future viable water resources, as well 
as pervasive deficiencies in the use and management of water resources, and 
the continuing degradation of the resource led to a number of initiatives to 
promote the sustainable, efficient use of water. 78 It was considered that the 
introduction of transferability in Australian reflected a concern for a more 
economically efficient allocation of the nation's water resources.79 The 
water management agencies in Australia have been interested in the 
implementation of transferable water rights since the early 1980's, often 
arising from the implementation of drought relief measures. 80 In 1983, 
South Australia was the first state to implement a scheme for the permanent 
and temporary transfer of water entitlements, followed gradually and in 
75 Counsell, above n 5, 35. 
76 Holden and Thobani ,above n 2, 13 . 
77 Pigram, above n 58, 5. 
78 Pigram, above n 58, 6. 
79 
John J. Pigram, Robert J Delforce, Michelle L Coelli,, Vol Norris, George Antony , 
Raymond L Anderson, Warren F Musgrave, above n 41 , 7. 
80 Pigram, above n 58, xiv. 
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varying degrees of formality, by New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland 
and Western Australia. 81 Australia is now considered to have one of the best 
examples of a tradable water rights system in the world. 
The 1994 Council of Australian Governments' (COAG) water reform 
framework and subsequent initiatives highlighted the need for Australia's 
national water resources to be managed in a more efficient and sustainable 
manner. One of the initiatives was to adopt tradable water rights. 82 The 
National Water Initiative was implemented by the Governments of Australia 
in June 2004. The objectives of the National Water Initiative were to 
improve water management, increase productivity and efficiency of water 
uses, arrest the decline in the health of river systems and the improved 
sustainability of rivers and/or catchments. 83 
A specific stated objective in the Intergovernmental Agreement on a 
National Water Initiative84 was the progressive removal of barriers to trade 
in water and meeting other requirements to facilitate the broadening and 
deepening of the water market, with an open trading market to be in place. 
Water markets were seen as one method of implementing the changes 
needed to satisfy these objectives. Before the implementation of tradable 
water rights, trades were hindered by the complexity of administrative 
arrangements, outdated market information, and the policies of some of the 
players in the system, for example, water corporations and other water 
providers. In order to create a more dynamic water market, with more 
productive and efficient use of water, the Intergovernmental Agreement has 
attempted to remove the obstacles that water users previously encountered 
when attempting to transfer water allocations. 
81 Pigram, above n 58, xv. See New South Wales introduced a trial scheme for temporary 
transfer of water entitlements in 1983 , Victoria introduced transferability in 198711988 and 
legislated for pennanent transferability in 1990, a temporary transfer scheme was 
introduced in Queensland in 1987 and trial schemes were implemented in Western 
Australia in 1992. 
82 Pigram, above n 58 , 6. 
83 Josh Carmody, above, n 46. 
84 Council of Australian Governments lnte,governmental Agreement on a National Water 
lnitiatil'e <http :// www.coag.gov.au/index.htm> (last accessed 20 August 2005). 
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The Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative requires 
that each State and Territory agree that their water market and trading 
arrangements will firstly facilitate the operation of efficient water markets 
and the opportunities for trading within, and between, States and Territories. 
For inter-regional trading, it is necessary that the water systems be shared or 
connected and water supply considerations permit water trading. States and 
Territories are required to minimise transaction costs on water trades, 
including through good infonnation flows in the market and compatible 
entitlement, registry, regulatory and other arrangements across jurisdictions. 
Thirdly, the States and Territories are to facilitate an appropriate mix of 
water products to develop based on access entitlements. Access entitlement 
can be traded either in whole or in part, temporarily or permanently, or 
through lease arrangements or other trading options that may evolve over 
time. States and Territories are obliged to recognise and protect the needs of 
the environment, and also provide appropriate protection of third party 
interests. Institutional and regulatory arrangements to facilitate intra and 
interstate trading are to be established by 2007. Temporary trades are to be 
immediately facilitated and barriers to permanent trade out of irrigation 
areas is to be progressively phased out by 2014.85 
Importantly, the Intergovernmental Agreement has established guidelines 
for maintaining water registries. As noted in the synopses above of the 
countries with a tradable water rights system implemented, keeping track of 
water transfers and permit holders is critical to the success of such a system. 
The Australian guidelines include a requirement for all water access 
entitlements to be recorded, as well as any trades of those entitlements and 
their location, that the water registers be of a sufficient standard to achieve 
the characteristics of secure water access entitlements, and to contain 
protocols for the protection of third party interests such as requiring third 
parties to be informed of any proposed dealings in relation to the water 
85Council of Australian Governments Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water 
Initiative- Attachment A, above n 84. 
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entitlement, with consent required from that third party before the transfer 
can occur. While there is no specific mention of when consent can be 
withheld contained in the Guidelines, presumably such consent cannot be 
withheld unreasonably or without good cause. 
For Western Australia, Statewide Policy No. 686 sets out the foundation for 
the implementation of transferable, or tradable water rights under the Rights 
in Water and Irrigation Act 1914, the principal legislation for managing the 
State's water resources. The Water and Rivers Commission sets out the 
benefits of tradable water rights as being the ability for water to migrate to 
higher economic uses, the introduction of new water users and industries, 
and the encouragement of more efficient use of water. 87 Tradable water 
rights are defined as "the ability of a licence holder to trade all or part of the 
licensed entitlement, to another water user". 88 Entitlements to water in 
Australia have always been tied to a corresponding area of land. Therefore, 
the only way for water to be transferred was via the sale of that land. The 
entitlement to water for consumptive use has been unbundled from the land 
and is described as a perpetual or open-ended share of the consumptive pool 
of a specified water resource, which is detennined by the relevant water 
plan. The water access entitlements are to specify the essential 
characteristics of the water product, be exclusive, able to be traded, given, 
bequeathed or leased, subdivided or amalgamated, mortgagable in the same 
way that freehold land can be used as collateral when accessing finance, be 
enforceable and enforced, and be recorded in publicly accessible reliable 
water registers that foster public confidence and are unambiguous as to who 
owns the entitlement and whatever encumbrances may be on that 
entitlement. 
86 Water and Rivers Commission Transferable (Tradeable) Water Entitlements for Western 
Australia (2001) Statewide Policy No. 6 <http://www.wrc.wa.gov.au> (last accessed 12 
August 2005). 
87 Water and Rivers Commission 2001, above n 86, i. 
88 Water and Rivers Commission 2001 , above n 86, 1. 
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VICTORIA U~Jl\lf.:RSITY OF WELLINGTON 
Australia has moved to convert previously ill-conceived and defined 
allocations into "tradable and bankable assets" through the specification of 
allocations with "clearly defined volumes and reliability, separation of 
entitlements from land, and ''unbundling" of various components of 
allocations, such the associated works, and use approvals and delivery 
capacity''. 89 Under the Australian system, farmers can buy and sell 
quantities of water from each other either temporarily, permanently, or in 
the future at market prices. There is competition between fanners for water 
with prices ranging from between AUD30 and AUD3000 a megalitre, with 
the average approximately AUDlOO a megalitre.90 During summer, 
approximately $50 million of water was traded. 91 The system is also 
considered to be less politicised, with users relying on commercial means 
rather than political means to resolve scarcity problems,92 with a 
consequence being a reduction in resources devoted to lobbying to influence 
decisions made under an administrative allocation system. 93 The water 
market is still considered thin in that transactions are nearly entirely 
contained in the irrigation sector with only irregular and infrequent 
intersectoral transfers, such as rural to urban use. 94 It is also notable that 
urgent clawbacks of water in Australia to attempt to reverse environmental 
damage caused by aggressive allocation and takes are creating uncertainty 
for investors as the security of their water rights become unstable. 95 
However, importantly, water markets are now widely accepted as being the 
most economic, efficient and sustainable means of dealing with the 
89 Roger Kerr, above n 30, 5. 
90 Andrew MacDonald, above n 33. 
9 1 Andrew MacDonald, above n 33. 
92 New Zealand Business Roundtable Submission on the Resource Management (Waitaki 
Catchment) Amendment Bill (submission made to Ministry for the Environment, 2004), 3. 
93 Roger Kerr, above n 30, 4. 
94 Pigram, above n 58 , 8. 
95 Ministry for the Environment Technical Working Paper Water Programme of Action-
Water Allocation and Use, above n 25. 
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resource. 96 The benefits of water trading in Australia are considered to have 
outweighed the costs, despite some unavoidable transitional issues.97 
VI What is needed for Tradable Water Rights to work? 
The mere sanctioning of transferable water permits in a regional or district 
plan will not necessarily result in water users actually transferring their 
water allocations. The right conditions need to exist to make the transfer of 
excess water an attractive and sensible option for permit holders. Thus, 
regional councils have a role to play in promoting the transferability of 
permits, helping to create a water market. 
Transferable water permits can work if demand exceeds supply for the 
resource and the resource is fully allocated as a result, ifthere is sufficient 
knowledge as to the state of the resource, if there is enforceability and 
monitoring of the permit, if private and community benefits exceed the 
transaction costs, and the market for transfer of permits is sufficiently 
flexible to enable transfers to occur. 98 
The necessary preconditions for a water market to exist have been outlined 
as follows99 : 
• Institutional arrangements that establish water rights that can be 
isolated from land rights; 100 
• the definition of the volumes of water to be traded and the security 
of supply and tenure under differing levels of resource availability; 
• adequate infrastructure to deliver the defined entitlements; 
96 Roger Kerr, above n 30, 4. 
97 Roger Kerr, above n 30, 5. 
98 Mike Kearney and Jim Sinner Transferable Water Permits: Two Case Studies of the 
Issues Technical Paper 97/12 (prepared for Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1997), 9. 
99 Pigram, above n 58 , 14-15. 
100 Robert C Johansson "Pricing Irrigation Water: A Literature Survey" (2000) Policy 
Research Working Paper 2449, World Bank, 9. 
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• quality assurance of water and delivery arrangements; 
• rules to maximise trading options and protect third party and 
sustainability interests; 
• consideration of the impact of trading on water storage and 
distribution systems; 
• appropriate legal support and protection and dispute resolution 
mechanisms; 
• education of water users and the community in the operation of the 
water market. 
A Transferability 
As noted above, water rights will transfer as a matter of course with a sale 
of land when they are included in the agreement for sale and purchase. 
However, transfers of water permits by themselves have not occurred in 
New Zealand to any great extent yet. There is no legal impediment to 
transferring water consents under the RMA, although it is acknowledged 
that transfers can be hindered by geographical and infrastructure issues. 
As transfers currently require application to the relevant regional council, 
transaction costs inhibit the process also. Discussion with consent holders in 
various areas of New Zealand were unaware that their water permits were 
transferable, showing the need for the council to promote the ability to 
transfer permits. In the Tasman District however, the transfer of permits is 
encouraged, yet the permit owners viewed the conditions around the transfer 
as a hindrance to actually carrying out the process. It is also important that 
some pennit holders feared losing their current consent, or having it altered 
if they applied to the council as part of the transfer process. Consents can be 
tied to land uses and specific areas which in some situations unavoidably 
inhibits transferability. It is relevant to the issue of transferability that 
council actions such as Tasman District's clawbacks have made many 
consent owners suspicious of the value of transferable water rights. There is 
a perception that if the council is approached to approve a transfer, that 
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excess water the subject of the transfer may be clawed back by the council 
and allocations subsequently reduced. 
B Duration/Security of title 
The key to market allocation is a well-defined, enforceable system of 
transferable property rights. 101 It has been stated that the single greatest 
problem in water resource management in the developing world is that 
"property rights in water are very insecure and ineffective". 102 The Council 
of Australian Governments' stipulated that for the successful 
implementation of a strategic framework for water property rights, water 
entitlements needed to be clearly specified in terms of rights and conditions 
of the ownership tenure, the share of the resource being allocated, the details 
of agreed standards of services being delivered, any constraints on 
transferability and any constraints on resource use or access. 103 
"Security" has been defined as not being guaranteed a precise amount of 
water at any time, but rather means knowing about the probability of water 
availability, and being certain of allocation procedures under changing 
circumstances. 104 "Duration" is especially important where water 
investment is concentrated in assets, such as irrigation infrastructure and 
dams. A short term property right does not encourage long term investment 
in, and sustainability of the resource, because the permit owner has to 
extract the maximum value from the resource in a more limited period of 
time. It is noted that this type of permit ownership may lead to management 
strategies which differ from those of a right owner whose right runs for a 
longer duration of time. 105 It should also be noted however that increasing 
the quality of title without ensuring that transferability and an operating 
10 1 Robert C Johansson, above n 99, 22. 
102 Pigram, above n 58, 14. 
103 Pigram, above n 58, 10. 
104 Marie Leigh Livingston "Designing Water Institution : Market Failures and Institutional 
Response" (1993) Policy Research Working Paper 1227 World Bank, 20. 
105 Harris Consulting The Agribusiness Group, above n 13, 9. 
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market is in place may result in the water rights being locked in so solidly 
that the water is unable to move to its most efficient or high value use. 106 
New Zealand permit holders who hold their permits for a term of 35 years 
felt that this term was essentially worthless as the consent conditions are 
vulnerable to change at any time 
Quality ohitle can be affected by water scarcity or availability, permit 
reviews to accommodate changes in catchment, regional, or national 
planning mechanisms, efficiency of use reviews, the granting of further 
pennits for the same area, review at the end of the period and cancellation if 
the permit is not used for five or more years. The "use it or lose it" 
philosophy can backfire, as in the Tasman District where combined with 
over-allocated resources and potential clawbacks by the council, permit 
owners have incentives to use their entire allocation so as to preserve their 
existing rights. The threat of further allocations also affects the security of 
existing permit holders rights. 
A secure, defined property rights system includes certainty ( engendered by 
specificity as to all aspects of the water right such as quantity, quality, 
location, and time of use), ease of transferability, an absence of externalities 
and the existence of market competition in both supply and demand. It was 
noted in the decision of Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation 
Association Inc v Minister for Natural Resources 107 by Spigelman CJ that a 
trading regime in access licences could only operate, and actual trading 
could only occur, if precise entitlements were known. It has also been noted 
that the Government should play a part in the basic a basic role of defining 
property rights. 108 
106 Harris Consulting The Agribusiness Group, above n 13, 22. 
107 Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association Inc v Minister for Natural 
Resources [2005] 138 LGERA 11, 26. 
108 John McMillan, above n 48, 11. 
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The lack of definition around property rights is a major issue for permit 
holders. Buyers and sellers need to be confident of the entitlements that they 
are trading and be aware of any conditions on the transferred rights. 
Therefore, it is fundamental that water rights be properly specified including 
security of tenure post transfer. 109 There is considered to be a lack of 
investigation and knowledge regarding the resource, resulting in uncertainty 
as to how much of a resource there is and how much can be allocated 
without affecting other permit holders' rights and the resource itself. 110 The 
lack of a sound, scientifically based planning environment adversely affects 
the security of a permit, especially if there is a lack of understanding on the 
side of the council as to the current allocation of a resource. 
C Flexibility 
Permits are often very specific for take and use, with the intention that take 
permit addresses effects on the resource and use deals with efficiency 
requirements and effects associated with how water used. 111 Digression 
from the terms of the pennit usually requires a review of the permit. While 
this can be useful when the pennit holder wishes to alter or vary the permit, 
tying the permit to specific land uses and areas places an additional barrier 
on the transferability of that pe1mit, although, as noted above, in some cases 
this will be unavoidable. 
Although the permit will usually be able to be altered to reflect a new land 
use, subject to the uncertainty that an increased allocation will be given if 
that is what the new land use requires, it still results in increased transaction 
costs. Although increased transactions costs are accepted by many permit 
holders as an inevitable part of the water pennit system, they still represent 
a further barrier to a market system. 
'
09 Pigram, above n 58 , 143. 
11 0 Han-is Consulting The Agribusiness Group, above n 13, 20. 
111 Harris Consulting The Agribusiness Group, above n 13, 15. 
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Permits issued in New Zealand appear to be relatively flexible, or where 
constraints are imposed, they are seen by the permit holders to be no more 
than minor inconveniences. Pennit holders did consider however, that while 
the permits were flexible in terms of allocations decreasing as a result of 
less water being used for a different use, the reverse was unlikely to happen 
in that the allocation would more than likely not increase if the change in 
use required more water. This one way flow was intensified by the absence 
of transfers because the users felt that once the water was gone, it would be 
extremely difficult for them to regain it by further allocation. 
VII What will make it difficult for Tradable Water Rights to work? 
A Concerns with water transfers 
The users who would potentially be involved in transferring water pennits 
articulated their concerns in a report prepared for the Ministry of the 
Environment. 112 People consider water to be a "free" resource or a 
public/common community property and are philosophically opposed to 
buying or selling it. This historical perception of water poses a hurdle for 
adequately placing a price on a water permit. This is an issue which will 
resolve itself in time, as water markets become established and users 
become more familiar with the system. Given the demand for water in the 
future, it is a truism that the public will have to make a philosophical leap to 
look at water as a commodity that can be bought and sold. 113 Water is now 
being treated as an economic good, as noted in the 1992 International 
Conference on Water and the Environment where it was concluded that 
"water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognised as an economic good". 114Some users consider that any unused 
water should be returned to the common pool for reallocation, while others 
indicated reluctance to trade excess water because of a concern that the 
11 2 Christina Robb, Matthew Morgan and Simon Harris, above n 27, 4. 
11 3 Andrew MacDonald, above n 33 . 
114 Roger Kerr, above n 30, 6. 
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water might be needed at some stage. 
115 Again, this appears to be a mind-set 
which stems from unfamiliarity with the concept of transferable water 
permits and could be altered after interaction with the system, especially as 
the "opportunity cost" of retaining the excess water as opposed to selling it 
is realised.' 16 One study suggests that as irrigators begin to evaluate 
different means of obtaining extra water, such as applying for a new permit 
from the council, investing in building retention dams or upgrading the 
irrigation system, transferring water may well emerge as the preferred 
option. Other users, while not objecting to transfers specifically, did oppose 
consent holders from profiting from a common resource and considered 
transferability needed to be paid for by those consent holders in some 
manner. An overriding concern relates back to the certainty of the water 
permit and its duration with users considering that time lengths on water 
rights might potentially be too restrictive. The effect of uncertainty over 
renewal could possibly result in water users delaying and restricting 
investment in water intensive uses, and exhibiting an increased reluctance to 
transfer excess water allocations, especially as the date of renewal 
approaches. 11 7 To do so, or even to transfer water as a matter of course, may 
suggest to the council that the permit holder does not require the full 
allocation they currently possess. It has been suggested that this concern 
could be allayed by the council treating, and announcing, that a transfer of 
water will be considered as a valid use in its own right with no impact on 
future allocation decisions.' 18 
A potential loss of the resource is seen as a real threat, with fears that water 
would be lost from agriculture to industry, urban uses and large processors. 
This concern emerges generally in regard to the monopolisation of a water 
market, invoking the image of a "water baron". The Commerce Act could 
potentially deal with any aggregation of interests by any one user, while a 
115 Mike Kearney and Jim Sinner, above n 97, 15. 
11 6 Mike Kearney and Jim Sinner, above n 97, 17. 
11 7 Counsell, above n 5, 20. 
11 8 Mike Kearney and Jim Sinner, above n 97, 17. 
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Water Commission could also be established to prevent any monopolisation 
occumng. 
Speculative buying and selling is seen as a potential issue, with water users 
desiring that water be kept for productive uses, rather than traded off with 
little concern as to the end destination of that water. This issue could be 
potentially exacerbated by the perception of some users that unused water 
rights will be retained by the permit holder until the highest prices can be 
obtained for those rights, i.e. in times of drought. 119 
Transfer of water permits is also seen to potentially increase the use of the 
resource, with consequent negative environmental effects. Increased use 
could potentially occur if currently unused permits ("sleeper permits") were 
transferred and subsequently exercised. Another side-effect of the activation 
of sleeper permits could be an increase of the frequency of restrictions on 
existing permit holders. 
Reduced productivity from the resource is also seen as a concern, in that 
currently the permit holder's most fertile land in the area is irrigated and any 
movement of the water from that land, such as by transfer of water 
allocation, would represent a reduction in productivity. This argument can 
be countered by the fact that if the productivity from that land does indeed 
outweigh what has been offered for the water irrigating that land, the permit 
holder will doubtless continue to irrigate that land. The transfer of water 
allocations is not obligatory and depends entirely on the returns the pennit 
holder receives from transferring the excess water. 
Effects on third parties have also been raised as a potential concern where a 
third party relying on the return flows from upstream users when the 
upstream user sells their excess allocation to users that are not from the 
same area. As a result, downstream users are deprived of the use of return 
flows. This result could potentially be prevented by a water user association 
119 Mike Kearney and Jim Sinner, above n 97, 15. 
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or public body approving requests for changes of water intake to ensure that 
third parties are not adversely affected in such a manner. 120 
Many of the concerns noted above stem from a distrust of the unknown. A 
regime of transferable water permits is unfamiliar to many permit holders 
and education is required to explain how the system would work and the 
benefits that can be gained from the implementation of such a system. 
VIII Developments to Date 
In his address to the Water Conference in pre-RMA 1988, the Rt Hon 
Geoffrey Palmer, then Minister for the Environment, stated 
121
: 
"At the moment, trade in water rights is prohibited. There is no 
incentive for surplus water to be returned to the stream or used 
elsewhere. Potentially efficient users of water may be denied 
access ... rights could be traded on a market." 
As noted earlier in the paper, the Tasman District Council encourages the 
transfer of water permits. The analysis above shows that the water permits 
have not been traded frequently and that the permit holders are suspicious of 
the system for a number of reasons, and that the conditions around the 
tradability or transferability of water were limiting in their ability to achieve 
any significant transfer of water. 122 The Tasman Council takes into account 
a number of factors when considering water transfers, such as the potential 
for adverse effects to arise from the transfer or change, as welt as the level 
of knowledge about the water body; the monitoring of water use; whether 
the transfer is within the same water management zone; the level of 
120 Holden and Thobani ,above n 2, 17. 
12 1 Palmer, Rt Hon G WR (1988) Ministerial Address, Water in society, policy and practice 
Papers of the Fifth National Water Conference, 15-19 August, Dunedin, 16. 
122 Harris Consulting The Agribusiness Group, above n 13 , 19. 
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allocation within the zone; whether water has been reserved for any purpose 
in the zone in which the water 
is being transferred and whether the transfer of water facilitates access to 
water that is augmented from a water augmentation scheme. 
A study was carried out in 1997 examining the Manawatu-Wanganui 
Regional Council's Oroua Catchment Water Allocation and River Flows 
Regional Plan, which the first example of a regional plan prepared under the 
RMA which incorporates a limited transferable water permit system. 
Transferable water permits were considered by the council to have the 
potential of increasing flexibility for the water users themselves, 
encouraging greater efficiency of water use during periods of scarcity and 
building a sense of community in the area. 123 10 year permits were granted 
to existing permit holders and new users are required to obtain their 
requirements from existing irrigators. The whole or part of an interest in a 
water permit is able to be transferred during water restriction periods, 
provided that the end use is irrigation, both sites are within the catchment, 
and the Council is informed in advance of the transfer. 124 The irrigator users 
(a large proportion of the resource users in the area) had two major concerns 
before the implementation of the system. Firstly, that large abstracters 
would monopolise the resource by virtue of their greater resources, and 
secondly, that existing permit holders needed protection of their rights while 
simultaneously not hindering new users wanting a permit. 125 To assuage 
these concerns, the Council detennined that only agricultural irrigators 
would be able to transfer the permits so as to preclude the large abstractors 
from monopolisation of the system. The Council also implemented a two-
tier permit system which is tied to threshold points of the river flow. When 
the river reaches a certain percentage of the mean monthly flow, new permit 
holders must cease abstraction while existing permit holders may continue 
restricted abstraction. Through this process, new permit holders must 
123 Mike Kearney and Jim Sinner, above n 97, 12. 
124 Basil M H Sharp, above n 28 , 6. 
125 Mike Kearney and Jim Sinner, above n 97, 12. 
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negotiate with existing permit holders to obtain water during the low flow 
periods. Existing permit holders also have had their permits 
"grand parented" to recognise the cost of the water permit, which was often 
included in the land price. Potential users wishing to obtain a water permit, 
or existing users requiring a larger allocation, must either obtain their permit 
from an existing permit holder, or applying for a permit from the council 
which is non-transferable. 126 
It is noted that, similarly to the pennit system in the Oroua catchment, 
Environment Canterbury is considering granting second-tier permits to new 
applicants, which can only be used when rivers are in high flow. 
IX Potential New Zealand Water Market 
New Zealand is notable in that it has numerous small, independent 
catchments in that they are not linked with other larger catchments which is 
the situation in Australia and the Western United States where large rivers 
with significant catchments are common. 127 This factor may be beneficial 
in setting up small water markets where they are most urgently needed and 
is supported by the idea In a country such as New Zealand, it may be more 
appropriate that water markets are viewed in terms of relatively independent 
market regions, defined by relevant catchments, rather than as a single 
national water market. 128 Rights to water resources have the difficult task of 
needing to be both flexible and secure. 129 Any water allocation decisions 
should be made in a similar fashion to Australian states where a catchment 
management system is adopted in which water resource plans are prepared 
as a result of consultation and modelling to determine the best way to 
126 Roger Kerr, above n 30 , 8. 
127 Counsell, above n 5, 4. 
128 Marie Leigh Livingston, above n 101 ,16. 
129 Marie Leigh Livingston, above n 101 , 2. 
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allocate water between competing users. The following criteria should also 
be considered when determining methods of water allocation: 130 
1) Is the allocation of supplies flexible? Can the resource be shifted 
from one area to another as demand may require? 
2) Is there security of tenure for established water users? 
3) Is the real opportunity cost of providing the resource being met 
by the water users? 
4) Is the outcome of the allocation process predictable so the 
system is as certain as it possibly may be? 
5) Is the allocation process equitable and perceived by the water 
users to be equitable? 
6) Is there political and public acceptance of the allocation process? 
7) Does the allocation system facilitate efficiency? 
8) Is the administrative side of the allocation system feasible and 
sustainable to allow further growth of the system? 
The existing system of water allocation could conceivably remain in place 
if tradable water rights were a routine part of possessing a water permit. The 
rights to use the water need to be unbundled from the land however, as this 
is currently affecting the volume of transfers. 
Potentially a Water Commission could undertake the role of granting 
allocations, notwithstanding that a user may already hold a water permit 
issued under the RMA, where all users have an option to take a minimum 
proportionate share of the current inflow that is available at any point in 
time and a maximum proportionate share of the total resource that is 
available during any year in that catchment. 131 Users with existing permits 
under the RMA would find their existing allocations converted, with 
corresponding takes of water allowed. Therefore each user is entitled to a 
130 Ariel Dinar, Mark W Rosegrant and Ruth Meinzen-Dick "Water Allocation 
Mechanisms: Principles and Examples" (1997) World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 1779, Washington DC,4-5 . 
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minimum share of the available inflow at any time, with an annual 
volumetric cap, with a maximum amount of water that is able to be 
allocated in any one catchment. The allocations should be periodically 
reviewed, bearing in mind that an indefinite time limit provides the user 
with the most security in terms of continued access to water and also 
weighing up unforeseeable future events, such as climatic change and 
resource use. A water market still requires that the rights to the water be 
clearly defined in a measurable way, 132 and therefore the allocations 
themselves must be precise as to the quantity of the allocation, the location, 
the uses to which the allocation is to be put and the times at which it may be 
used. It is critical that the initial allocations be well-defined to facilitate 
subsequent trades of the allocations, with each participant in the water trade 
having certainty as what is being transferred. Each user would be required to 
be registered and keep accurate records of take or use from the relevant 
catchment. The register of permit owners would need, as per the Australian 
guidelines, to specify the quantity allowed in the allocation, the location of 
the allocation and that of any transfers that occur, and provide for the 
consultation with affected third parties as described below. 
As New Zealand has a small population and relatively small catchments, 
any water market that arises is likely to be a thin one, given that there will 
be only small numbers of buyers and sellers. This is not a limiting factor 
however as many water markets develop in isolation given the expenditure 
involved in physically transporting water. 133 
Given this expenditure and its limiting effect on transactions, long-term 
secure arrangements would be optimal for the facilitation of water transfers, 
and building confidence in the tradable water rights regime. The 
Government should play a role in maintaining existing infrastructure and 
developing additional infrastructure as adequate infrastructure can increase 
131 Tim Stewart (2004) Water Allocation Presentation to the CE's Forum" Meridian 
Energy, 8. 
132 Holden and Thobani ,above n 2, 14. 
133 Robert C Johansson, above n 99, 10. 
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the success of water markets by expanding its boundaries. A physical 
delivery system is a key factor in the success of a water market. The issue of 
privatisation has relevance here but requires greater analysis than this paper 
can devote to it. Privatisation is controversial and requires in-depth public 
consultation and discussion. Before investment was warranted in such 
infrastructure expenditure, it would need to be determined that a water 
market would produce sufficient benefits to outweigh the costs. 
The ability to transfer the allocation either permanently or temporarily 
should be explicit, as well as information regarding the ownership of the 
allocation once it has been transferred. The allocations should not be tied to 
land uses or to specific areas, although it is inevitable that the geographical 
nature of the country will inhibit transfers in some areas. In this regard, 
there should not be a differentiation in consumptive uses and non-
consumptive uses because all water users should be treated equally. To try 
and distinguish between the two uses may lead to discrepancies in treatment 
and a resultant skewed perception of the system by a consumptive user or a 
non-consumptive user. For a water market to be successful, it is vital that 
the initial allocation of water rights be regarded as equitable in the 
dispensing of allocations and treatment of participants. In oroer to maintain 
equitableness of the system, an effective system of monitoring needs to be 
established, so that any adverse effects on the environmental health of the 
catchment is detected in time for any required changes to be made, with the 
minimum disruption to the security of pennit holders' rights. This is 
paramount in maintaining the health and longevity of the resource, and 
lessons can be learned from the Australian experience. The transaction 
costs should not be so high that they outweigh the benefits of transfer. If 
they are so substantial that no economic benefit will arise from the transfer, 
they will inhibit any transfers occurring. Transactions costs can include the 
costs of negotiation with the other water user or users involved, as well as 
the costs involved with fulfilling legal and administrative requirements 
necessary to complete the transfer. They have been cited as the cause of 
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limited transfers in some water markets. 134 Affected third parties would 
need to be informed as to the potential transfer and have the ability to 
withhold consent where their interests would be adversely affected. A 
disputes resolution service would need to be implemented to resolve issues 
that arose over proposed transfers or to address the concerns of third parties 
who had not been consulted with. 
It was noted earlier in this paper that a water market still requires the 
allocation of water rights to be enforced. An effective system of enforcing 
allocations and dealing with transgressions would need to be established, 
with water use monitored, breaches of the system detected and punished in 
accordance with provisions in the RMA that provide for the imposition of 
fines and imprisonment. Monitoring and detection of breaches is admittedly 
a difficult issue given the number of users, however reliable use monitoring 
is important to a functioning water market. Installing such a system may be 
an unfeasible expense for many users. It is noted that the Tasman Council 
has considered making financial contributions obligatory in its regional 
plan. All councils charge applicants directly for the costs associated with 
granting a consent. 135 This is provided for in section 108 of the RMA which 
allows the imposition of conditions associated with any resource consent 
granted. A financial contribution would be a pre-condition of obtaining a 
resource consent to use water in order to remedy or mitigate the adverse 
effects of reduced water flows or levels. Factors taken into account would 
include the effectiveness of such a financial contribution to offset adverse 
effects; the effectiveness of a financial contribution to offset adverse effects 
on other water users, or uses and values of a water body; the effectiveness of 
a financial contribution to improve existing water users security of supply; 
the need for a direct relationship between the size and significance of any 
adverse effect of the resource consent and the level of any financial 
contribution. A percentage of contributions could be directed towards 
increasing the monitoring of water allocations, especially given that 
134 Marie Leigh Livingston, above n 101 , 16. 
135 Lincoln Environmental, above n 32. 
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accurate statistics on the water take would provide useful information on the 
state of the catchment, with potential problems able to be identified at an 
early stage, allowing intervention. It is considered that this is an area where 
the Government should play a role in facilitating the effectiveness and 
success of the water market. 
As observed in Chile, there could be potential for water user associations to 
be established by certain groups, potentially farmers in the same area or 
with takes from the same catchment, or irrigators in one area. The use of 
such an association could result in successful negotiations for water 
transfers, acceptable costs for such transfers which outweigh transaction 
costs, and an increased sense of security and community. Belonging to a 
water user association may help to allay the trepidation of many water users 
with regards to the concept of tradable water rights, given that a group of 
water users would generally collectively have greater experience and 
confidence in dealing with other buyers and sellers than if each water user 
were negotiating on their own. These associations are often set up for the 
benefit of irrigators, although there have been examples of associations that 
serve all water users for a common water source. The associations manage 
and maintain infrastructure to deliver the water and are also responsible for 
recording, managing and enforcing the water rights and transfers. 136 Water 
user associations could also play a role in the monitoring of allocation use 
by its members. Rosegrant and Gazmuri 137 consider that assigning tradable 
water rights to individuals within water user associations should have the 
effect of enhancing the control of the group over the water resource as well 
as creating incentives for the association members to economise on water 
use and providing the members with the legal standing to negotiate, for 
example with water delivery agencies, for timely and efficient service. 
136 Counsell , above n 5, 40. 
137 • 
Mark W Rosegrant and Renato Gazmuri, above n 42. 
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IX Conclusion 
There is no universal best practice for New Zealand. It is considered that 
government intervention by way of administrative water allocation is an 
unsuitable process for water allocation in New Zealand by virtue of the 
considerable negative economic and environmental effects that result from 
the administrative process. 138 Centralised decision-making has not resulted 
in a comprehensive, working water allocation regime. The current system 
does not distinguish between high value uses and low value uses, and 
provides no incentive for conservation of water. Consequently the resource 
is utilised in an inefficient and unsustainable manner. 
The issue of demand outstripping supply is already present in some areas of 
New Zealand, with some resources over-allocated while others are nearing 
full allocation. Increasing demand for water in the future, especially given 
uncertain energy supplies, will exacerbate the problem, a situation which the 
cumbersome, inflexible administrative allocation system will not be able to 
respond and adapt to. The alternative of tradable water rights ensure that 
water will go to the best valued use, with the price of the resource reflecting 
the value of the potential alternative uses. Incentives are created to put the 
water to its most productive use, whether that is selling an excess allocation 
or putting it to an alternative use. A market-based system also encourages 
the conservation of the resource. A water market allows the decisions about 
water use to be made by those who possess the greatest information on the 
use and value of the resources, as well as providing the flexibility and 
adaptability to respond to the dynamism of changes in demand and supply 
of water in response to market variations and external influences, such as 
weather conditions. 139 
For a market to work efficiently, permit holders require certainty, flexibility 
and transferability. For a permit holder to have confidence in the certainty of 
138 Robert Brooks and Edwyna Harris, above n 6, 3. 
139 Roger Kerr, above n 30, 4. 
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his or her allocation, the right to the water must be clearly defined with 
specificity as to all aspects of that right, such as quantity, location, and use. 
Without this certainty, buyers of water rights cannot have confidence in the 
entitlements they are purchasing. If a buyer cannot have confidence in their 
investment, a water market will not be successful. Flexibility is essential for 
transferring a water right without undue complication and difficulty. If 
restraints on the transfer of the water pennit are minor, users will continue 
to trade, however if the restraints are too restrictive, trading in water rights 
will simply not occur. Finally, a lack of impediments to the transferability of 
allocations is key. If the allocation is unable to be transferred, this naturally 
will never happen. 
For tradable water rights to be implemented with success in New Zealand, 
education of water users as to the benefits of such a system is vital. There is 
evidence that some users are completely unconcerned about the prospect of 
trading water and simply see it as means to direct water to its highest value 
or most efficient use. The unfavourable attitude of many water users 
towards a tradable water rights system is potentially the greatest barrier in 
implementing such a system, yet could also be one of the least costly 
barriers to remove. Presently many of the concerns raised regarding tradable 
water rights stem from an attitudinal aspect and from unfamiliarity with the 
process. Examples of these concerns are that water is a "public good" and as 
such should not be bought and sold, and that a tradable water rights system 
will lead to potential monopolisation of the resource by those with the 
greatest resources. A change in mindset to viewing water as an economic 
good is inevitable, as demand grows and scarcity increases. Education about 
the system and assurances that users will not be forced out of the water 
market will be crucial to addressing most uncertainties about the tradable 
water rights system. 
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